I am writing to express my appreciation for this post and your superb paper on "Oslo's Misreading of an Honor-Shame Culture," referenced in your post.
My area of study since 1972 has been Russia, under the communists and now the Chekists. There is the same problem of mirror-imaging in this field as in those trying to make peace, Western-style, with the Palestinians and their IGRC sponsors. Even if one knows better intellectually, it is a constant struggle to override one's normal instincts to understand those who think fundamentally differently than we do. Your paper laid this out beautifully.
My understanding of how compromise could be used in the service of aggression was enhanced by a study of Gorbachev's new political thinking -- an all-out infowar/infopeace attempt to get the US to let down its guard and stop pursuing Reagan's stalwart policies, which the Soviets attempted in the late 1980s after they realized they had lost the Cold War. I outlined my analysis of this in the 1992 U.S. Information Agency report to Congress "Soviet Active Measures in the 'Post-Cold War' Era," which is archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20170506215606/http:/intellit.muskingum.edu/russia_folder/pcw_era/, which may possibly be of interest.
Alexander Lebedev, who was head of the Foreign Political Information Section of the CC CPSU Ideology Department during 1990 explained the Leninist logic of how to use compromise and conciliation to gain advantage while in a position of weakness in his 1989 Novosti publication "The Problem of Compromise in Politics As Seen by Lenin in the First Post-Revolutionary Years (1918-1921)." It is a fascinating short book, although unfortunately not available on the Internet. For the heart of the matter, see the chapters in my report on:
Yes, it's part of the same syndrome, IMHO, caused by an inabilty to imagine and/or extreme discomfort with the idea of being threatened by a more-or-less permanent enemy, which is very disconcerting, even terrifying. In the case of the Soviets, their collapse happened so quickly that many people didn't realize the role played by Reagan in bringing it about, as he leveraged our technological strengths to place unbearable pressure on a Soviet system weakened by communist strangulation of the economy and suppresison of legitimate national aspirations for freedom and independence for 75 years. Reagan understood those weakness very well and the enormous challenge posed by SDI and the agreement with KSA to increase oil production, which dramatically lowered oil prices and Soviet cash flow, created a desperate, immediate need for the Sovs to reduce tensions. Glasnost, perestroika, and "new political thinking" were the response, with the goal of "eliminating the enemy image," which Arbatov called their "secret weapon." They saw lowering the threat profile of the USSR as the key to getting the US to abandon Reagan's staunch policies, but to make this gambit credible, Gorbachev had to forego the use of force in keeping the satellite states of Eastern Europe in line. With this threat gone, they soon challenged Soviet authority and dramatically broke free. The Baltics and Caucasus quickly followed and the USSR soon collapsed, seemingly under its own weight, but in reality due to Reagan's brilliant strategy to win the Cold War by presenting them a threat their system could not cope with. The prestige press didn't want to give a right-wing "ideologue" who was seen by many as an "amiable dunce" any credit for this brilliant military/economic strategy, especially because the collapse happened after he had left office. So, many people didn't understand why we won and still don't.
Detente with the USSR in the 1970s went nowhere, while Reagan's briiliant strategy to win the Cold War by leveraging our military/economic/technological strengths to bring unbearable pressure to bear on the Soviet's military/economic/technological weaknesses caused them to collapse very quickly. No such happy victory seems likely with Israel's enemies, but it's likely worth pondering Iran's weaknesses with a view to thinking about the vulnerabilities they present, as Iran seems to be the main engine threatening Israel through multiple proxies and directly.
I am writing to express my appreciation for this post and your superb paper on "Oslo's Misreading of an Honor-Shame Culture," referenced in your post.
My area of study since 1972 has been Russia, under the communists and now the Chekists. There is the same problem of mirror-imaging in this field as in those trying to make peace, Western-style, with the Palestinians and their IGRC sponsors. Even if one knows better intellectually, it is a constant struggle to override one's normal instincts to understand those who think fundamentally differently than we do. Your paper laid this out beautifully.
My understanding of how compromise could be used in the service of aggression was enhanced by a study of Gorbachev's new political thinking -- an all-out infowar/infopeace attempt to get the US to let down its guard and stop pursuing Reagan's stalwart policies, which the Soviets attempted in the late 1980s after they realized they had lost the Cold War. I outlined my analysis of this in the 1992 U.S. Information Agency report to Congress "Soviet Active Measures in the 'Post-Cold War' Era," which is archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20170506215606/http:/intellit.muskingum.edu/russia_folder/pcw_era/, which may possibly be of interest.
Alexander Lebedev, who was head of the Foreign Political Information Section of the CC CPSU Ideology Department during 1990 explained the Leninist logic of how to use compromise and conciliation to gain advantage while in a position of weakness in his 1989 Novosti publication "The Problem of Compromise in Politics As Seen by Lenin in the First Post-Revolutionary Years (1918-1921)." It is a fascinating short book, although unfortunately not available on the Internet. For the heart of the matter, see the chapters in my report on:
"New Thinking" in Perspective: the Soviet View
The Soviet View of Compromise and Conciliation
Eliminating the "Enemy Image"
Many thanks for your tireless efforts.
thanks for this highly informed response. will read your essay asap.
it's interesting that we went right from misreading the Soviets to misreading the Palestinians in the early 1990s.
Yes, it's part of the same syndrome, IMHO, caused by an inabilty to imagine and/or extreme discomfort with the idea of being threatened by a more-or-less permanent enemy, which is very disconcerting, even terrifying. In the case of the Soviets, their collapse happened so quickly that many people didn't realize the role played by Reagan in bringing it about, as he leveraged our technological strengths to place unbearable pressure on a Soviet system weakened by communist strangulation of the economy and suppresison of legitimate national aspirations for freedom and independence for 75 years. Reagan understood those weakness very well and the enormous challenge posed by SDI and the agreement with KSA to increase oil production, which dramatically lowered oil prices and Soviet cash flow, created a desperate, immediate need for the Sovs to reduce tensions. Glasnost, perestroika, and "new political thinking" were the response, with the goal of "eliminating the enemy image," which Arbatov called their "secret weapon." They saw lowering the threat profile of the USSR as the key to getting the US to abandon Reagan's staunch policies, but to make this gambit credible, Gorbachev had to forego the use of force in keeping the satellite states of Eastern Europe in line. With this threat gone, they soon challenged Soviet authority and dramatically broke free. The Baltics and Caucasus quickly followed and the USSR soon collapsed, seemingly under its own weight, but in reality due to Reagan's brilliant strategy to win the Cold War by presenting them a threat their system could not cope with. The prestige press didn't want to give a right-wing "ideologue" who was seen by many as an "amiable dunce" any credit for this brilliant military/economic strategy, especially because the collapse happened after he had left office. So, many people didn't understand why we won and still don't.
Detente with the USSR in the 1970s went nowhere, while Reagan's briiliant strategy to win the Cold War by leveraging our military/economic/technological strengths to bring unbearable pressure to bear on the Soviet's military/economic/technological weaknesses caused them to collapse very quickly. No such happy victory seems likely with Israel's enemies, but it's likely worth pondering Iran's weaknesses with a view to thinking about the vulnerabilities they present, as Iran seems to be the main engine threatening Israel through multiple proxies and directly.
Thanks for dusting off and publishing this essay. A great read, and terrific thinking material.
glad you liked it. i hesitated, but there were so many things in there, including good links. seemed like a waste to drop it.
The Jews are the chosen people: topic for a whole 'nother essay!
you mean this one?
https://rlandes.substack.com/p/the-paradoxical-proof-that-jews-are?r=lo3t&showWelcomeOnShare=true&triedRedirect=true